1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Basra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Basra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

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a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver "Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

advantage of extensive fertile tracts and abundant water, it made but a poor showing in the exports it permitted, and the low standard of life it sustained. It was, and is, possible indeed to exaggerate the potentialities of 'Iraq agriculture;[1] areas cultivable by flow or lift-irrigation are not unlimited;[2] even with the best of conservation, its river-water resources can never suffice, at one time, for all or nearly all its irrigable lands; and the rains[3] upon which northern 'Iraq wholly depends are capricious and rarely sufficient. Barrage-irrigation could never be as easily achieved as in Egypt, and its cost must always place at a disadvantage, against a Canada or a Russia, countries which like central 'Iraq are dependent on it. The indigenous 'Moroccan' and the invading 'Najdi' locust were an annual menace to crops. The 'Iraqi *fallaḥ*, even when helped by a large measure of mechanization, was and is no match for the European or North American as a producer.

In the 'Iraq of 1900, at any rate, there were reasons enough for agricultural, and therefore universal, poverty. Conditions were tolerable in the rain-fed areas of Mosul and Shahrizur, where village organization prevailed, taxation was reasonable, the dangers of flooding unknown, land-holdings often small and personal: tolerable, too, on other lines, in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab date-belt where security was good, society well rooted, and the growers' skill highly developed. If even in these two zones a lifetime of debt and near-starvation were the lot of most men, elsewhere, throughout lower 'Iraq, neither the social structure nor Government measures towards land settlement had produced conditions within which progress was possible. Security was habitually threatened over great areas by the aggression of neighbours or the depredations of the *badu* and their hungry camels. Even where tenure was reasonably secure, the prevalent crop-sharing system supplied but the barest living to the cultivator: the shaykhs and their agents, absentee landlords, and a blindly grasping Government combined to remove both the reward of past and the incentive for future toil. No shaykh and no landlord conceived a duty of improving productivity; wherever local agriculture called for combined and organized effort—silt-clearing, flood-bank protection, locust warfare, drainage—they provided no capital, no superior guidance, little co-ordination, no sense of social obligation. Government

[1] It may be that, even in the legendary past, agricultural prosperity was somewhat less than is vaunted: the rains were no more copious, floods as ruinous, the swamps as vast, the *badu* as rapacious; and the great canals, to judge by the lack of surviving ruined headworks, may have been, after all, only flood-channels annually silt-cleared.

[2] Some 20 million acres in irrigable areas (south and central 'Iraq), 10 million of rain-lands in the north.

[3] The annual average for Mosul area is some 450 mm., and more in the hills: in central 'Iraq, 150 mm.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the resources to initiate new methods or improve the old.

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and discouraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

Too few countries in the world were greater changes brought by the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards. The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

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Had it been possible for broader views on practical economic internationalism to prevail in 'Iraq and its neighbours, valuable lessons could perhaps have been drawn from the operations of M.E.S.C.

The shortage of goods, the high price of local produce, and the abundant military expenditure could not be without effect on living standards. Until the middle of 1941 the country's economy was almost normal; prices rose little and currency in circulation had scarcely increased. But thereafter conditions quickly deteriorated. A poor harvest, the decrease in imports, and military expenditure produced conditions of menacing inflation. Government had no better solution than half-hearted and unenforced regulations to deal with the problems of procurement, control, and distribution, which in a few weeks became urgent. The cost of living rose in 1942 to a level of three or even four times that of 1939. The volume of currency in circulation rose threefold, then sixfold, while bank deposits increased correspondingly. Government, happy to receive the greatly increased revenues which rescued it from the alarming penury of mid-1941, was unwilling to adopt strong measures to drain off purchasing power by higher taxation, or by loan issues (until 1945), or by the sale of State lands save on a trifling scale: was unwilling, indeed, to adopt the firm but unpopular measures for which the situation called. Some sales of gold and of diamonds made available by the British Government could do little to correct the position. A slight improvement, thanks to an abundant harvest and lower export-prices, was achieved in 1943 and prevented a further rise of living costs, already six times those of 1939. But the armistice found conditions in the territory scarcely less inflationary, and the tone of its society scarcely healthier.

Government finance in war-time pursued an abnormal course. The three years 1941–3, in spite of high costs, showed useful surpluses; foreign debts could be paid, war-time allowances were made to officials, and development plans were viewed hopefully. But the two following years gave a less happy result; Government revenues did not keep pace with expenditure, the social services and the Police were allowed to expand, and officials multiplied. Normal expenditure, ID 8 million in 1939, reached ID 15 million in 1943 and ID 21 million in 1945. This last year found 'Iraq approaching a financial position less sound than it appeared. The separate finances of the Railways and the Port of Baṣra were highly prosperous throughout the war.

'Iraq's first internal loan, issued early in 1945, was in two parts. The first was a loan of ID 1 million bearing 2 per cent. interest for twenty years, and 2 per cent. in lottery prizes; the second was of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of nearly 7 million tons of through-put annually and a corresponding loss of royalty revenue. On the northern line to Tripoli, the construction of the 16-inch line was completed in mid-1949; export from Tripoli was thereby trebled and raised 'Iraqi export production to nearly 7 million tons a year. Less than a year later the Company undertook the building of a much greater pipeline, of 30-inch diameter. Designed to run from Kirkuk to the sea coast at Banyas in Syria (an alignment parallel to that of the 12- and 16-inch lines except at its western extremity) it would deliver 'Iraqi oil to the world's markets at a rate of some 14 million tons a year at its lowest rate of through-put, or much more with increased pumping installations.[1]

These extensions of the pipeline system were accompanied by important increases to the pumping plant and facilities at seven pumping stations on both sides of the point of bifurcation near Ḥaditha, and in the Kirkuk field itself. The development of the latter was carried out in its northern extension in Arbil liwā, beyond the Lesser Zab, by an active drilling campaign and the manifold operations which accompany it. With drilling went the provision of gathering lines, tankage, additional de-gassing stations, new units in the Stabilization Plant, new administrative and domestic buildings, workshops, stores, depots, laboratories, electric-power plant, and water lines. 'Iraqis were fortunate in their certainty that, in the development of the great wealth in their soil, the most modern and economic methods were being adopted without waste of or danger to its resources. The needs of the labour force were met by the initiation of a modern housing estate for 'Iraqi employees, canteens, sports grounds, transport to and from work, allowances and pay-revisions to meet the high cost of living, a savings fund, hospital extensions, and technical education both in 'Iraq and in the United Kingdom. In spite of the psychological, the material, and the (artificially fostered) 'political' difficulties inseparable from the presence of an advanced industrial enclave in a primitive economy of peasants, the living and working conditions of the oil workers were, while less than perfect, undoubtedly the best in contemporary 'Iraqi industry: and they were undeserving of the blatantly mendacious attacks, common in Baghdad newspapers, on the horrors of oil company employment and the brutality of the foreign exploiter. The industry brought also substantial indirect benefits to the public in local purchases and contracts, the increase of purchasing power, the provision of foreign exchange, the teaching of industrial skill, and the performance of valuable and costly services to Kirkuk municipality. It could in

[1] The 30-inch line, constructed at great speed, came into initial operation in the late spring of 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty years since Independence, there had been change in directions which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State.

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

[1] The mausoleum of King Faysal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power station at Baghdad was the property of a British company, that of Basra belonged to the Port, while Kirkuk was supplied with current by its all-providing oil company.

The revised labour legislation of 1942, the activity of the Ministry of Social Affairs, interest in International Labour Office literature and standards, and the employment since 1949 of a British expert on labour questions were guarantees that, though part of the Code was not applied, progress was real towards an effective interest in urban labour conditions and safeguards; it extended to trade union organization, the establishment of Labour Exchanges, housing schemes and welfare, and plans for social security whose realization was delayed only by their high cost. Meanwhile limited welfare facilities—dispensaries, canteens, clubs, sports grounds—were offered voluntarily by a few employers such as the Port, the Railways, and the more considerable industrial companies. They were provided on a much larger scale, and as part of a comprehensive organization, by the oil companies.

In domestic living standards, if it was true that the modernization and Westernization of the urban middle and lower-middle classes still left 'the poor' little better provided in their own homes than fifty years earlier, yet the proportion of households able to rise above their old deficiencies had much increased, and the private life of the middle as of the upper classes showed that in their domestic equipment and housing, hygiene, clothes, and range of interests great changes had been somehow effected in the last two generations. In men's and women's clothing, in the appearance and conduct of households, the serving of meals, and more generally in family and social life, Western ways had gained much ground. Resistance to the emancipation of women was now narrowing; the Muslim veil was frequently discarded; women learned and taught, entered the professions of medicine and law, followed politics (including Communism), took part in social work, and through their Women's Society were heard to demand the franchise. Circles, however, where women were strictly secluded were still considerable, and included the households of many leading notables and the royal family itself.

Social life was diversified by increased visiting between families, by the cinematograph, by cabarets of both Oriental and Western type, by casinos and modernized cafés. The traditional coffee shop kept its place for the male members of all classes and, within the social grade for which each catered, was still the club and business centre of thousands. Club life had developed to include the exclusive social clubs of the rich, the middle-class professional clubs of the lawyers, Army officers, and officials of various branches of Government, and a dozen sporting clubs; but the

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

of modern pump irrigation, both landowners and urban speculators were able as pump providers to secure further advantages over the small peasant cultivator. The outcome of this combination of cupidity and circumstance is such that an experienced investigator into the land problems of the Near and Middle East maintains that 'the bulk of the land has come into the hands of a class from whom no leadership in agricultural methods can be expected and which is tyrannous, callous and oppressive'. This generalization is, however, not entirely just, for a minority of the landowners appear to take a greater interest in the welfare of their tenants than might be assumed. But, with few exceptions, the share-cropping peasant cultivator of Iraq lives a hard life of poverty which is only mitigated by ignorance of better conditions.

It is necessary that this problem of land tenure and its effects on the economic and social life of the country should be fully appreciated, and this for three vital reasons.

Firstly, the land is the main source of the future wealth of Iraq, and consequently of revenue for educational and other social purposes. There are, of course, those other possible sources of increased revenue indicated earlier in this chapter and, as will be suggested later, it is to be expected that the steadily increasing royalties from oil exploitation will contribute to the country's resources for social progress. But it must be reiterated that the most important source of national wealth in Iraq is the land.

Secondly, although improved methods of agriculture and of the organization of rural life are badly needed, these are hardly likely to be promoted by landowners who are interested in the *status quo*.

The agricultural productivity of 'the land between the two rivers', once renowned for its robust fertility and abundant crops, has fallen to an extraordinarily low level. The superficial causes of this lamentable state of affairs are primitive methods of husbandry, the lack of application of power and science to the land, insufficiency of irrigational facilities and the misuse of those that exist. Until improved methods of cultivation, stock rearing, harvesting and marketing, accompanied by a sound system of agricultural education both in the schools and at the adult level are applied, there can be little prospect of the land of Iraq being that rich source of wealth through which the people may live more abundantly. These improvements, however, are not likely to materialize under the existing land tenure system.

Thirdly, there can be little expectation that Iraq, constitutionally a democratic country, will develop effective democratic institutions, both centrally and locally, so long as the standards of the bulk of the population remain at so low a level.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant in relation to the future development of education in that, if it continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

I. Introduction

311 Iraq possesses impressive potentialities for economic develop-
161 ment. With a total population of about 5,000,000 and an area of
131 168,400 square miles, Iraq is sparsely populated in relation to its resources. Although all but a relatively narrow belt in the north and northeast has insufficient rainfall to sustain agriculture, the country's twin river systems—the Tigris and Euphrates—can provide large amounts of water for irrigation. Much of its soil is inherently fertile and with ample water, manpower and implements,
[135] the area under cultivation might be almost tripled. In oil, Iraq possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but also a cheap source of power and raw materials essential to the development of industry, agriculture and transportation; and it may have other mineral resources susceptible of commercial exploitation. There is little doubt that the country can ultimately maintain a much larger population on a considerably higher standard of living.

● 511 As yet, however, this economic potential is in sharp contrast to the poverty prevailing in Iraq. The standard of living of the people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most ID 30.[1] Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and many are subject to debilitating diseases such as malaria, hookworm and bilharzia. Housing and sanitation are for the most part
433 primitive. The fundamental reasons for these conditions are low
311 output and low productivity. Most of the manpower on the land is
[464] underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities. Vast tracts of land await reclamation and irrigation before they can be used. Much of the available water is wasted owing to lack of storage and regulation of
[731] flow. In the spring disastrous floods often inundate large areas; and in the fall water is acutely short. Agricultural output is hampered not only by the inadequate and irregular supply of water, but also by the progressive salination of the soil in the irrigated
[241] areas. Agricultural techniques are primitive, the number and quality of draft animals are inadequate and there is insufficient
433 equipment. Industry is little developed. Although perhaps as many

[1] One Iraqi dinar equals £1 or $2.80.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

654* 651 [425] rent tax was abolished in return for certain payments to be made by the landholders over a maximum period of ten years. Thus the tax system discriminates in favor of those who have managed to obtain state lands in *lazmah* grant and against those who have regularly leased land from the state. The latter continue to be assessed for rent whereas the former, who have frequently secured large *lazmah* grants on the basis of rather tenuous proof of occupancy and cultivation, escape any tax or rent assessments on their land.

The application of a graduated income tax to agriculture, while equitable, may not be politically feasible at present and would certainly pose difficult problems of assessment. Consideration should be given, however, to the reintroduction of some type of land tax. The fact that the cadastral survey is only half completed would not be an insuperable obstacle. In most cases the land held by each individual will be well known in the locality where he resides. Landholders could be required to register for taxation all the land they claim with the provision that they would not be allowed to establish claims during the cadastral survey to any lands not so registered; and in case of conflicts between actual occupants and other claimants, the tax could provisionally be levied on the actual occupant. It would probably be desirable to levy the tax on cultivable land rather than land actually under cultivation in order to provide an incentive to production or, alternatively, to release idle land for resettlement. Tax rates would have to vary in accordance with productivity of the land, which could, as in some other countries, be ascertained through tests or control plots located in various parts of the country. The tax rate should presumably also take into account the government contribution to irrigation of the land. The adoption of such a land tax might be linked with the gradual reduction and perhaps ultimate abolition of the *istihlak*.

X. Conclusion

● 511 Today the people of Iraq for the most part suffer from dire poverty. Although a relatively small number of city merchants and landowners enjoy high incomes, the average standard of life is extremely low. The future would hold little prospect for relief if

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

the only remedy available were a more equitable division of income. Fortunately, the future does afford the promise of a large increase in national income as a whole. The country has the natural resources—land, water and oil—which can bring a much higher standard of living to all. The revenues from oil will provide the means for a potentially rapid development of other productive resources. The central objective must be the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole.

In a country like Iraq principal emphasis will inevitably need to be placed on the development of agriculture. For this reason schemes for the storage of the flood waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris will be of key importance. They will prevent disastrous floods and control the flow of the rivers so as to bring more water to deficient areas and open up large new areas for settlement by land-hungry peasants. An increase in production, however, will not come simply from an expansion of the area under cultivation. The time will come when further expansion will not be possible except at great cost. This makes it all the more necessary to raise the present low productivity of agriculture. The drainage of lands which have deteriorated owing to salting has accordingly been emphasized by the Mission as one of the first objectives. Great importance is also attached to the early development of an adequate agricultural extension service, supported by an effective practical experimental organization, which would work directly with farmers in improving their methods of production. Other measures recommended to this end include the provision of incentives to use fertilizers and to cultivate soil-building and fodder crops, and the organization of cooperatives and more ample credit facilities so that farmers can have easier access to improved means of production—better plows and draft animals, other agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizers.

Industrial development can in many ways effectively complement agriculture. The proposed chemical plant at Kirkuk, supplemented by bonemeal plants, could provide the cheap fertilizers needed to raise the productivity of Iraqi agriculture. Expansion of cotton textile and vegetable oil extraction capacity would capitalize on the growing output of cotton. The proposed modern machine shop would cater to agriculture by reducing the cost of irrigation

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

literacy in the country is a fair guide to the extent to which the Iraqi can be considered educated. According to the census, which recorded the literacy of all those of five years of age or over, literacy in Baghdad among males over five was over 40 percent; in the smaller towns of the province it was about 30 percent and in the villages only 10 percent. These figures are probably well above the average. Cities like Basra and Kirkuk have a male literacy nearer 30 percent, but in many rural *nahiyas* it is five percent or less and in the remoter *nahiyas* of the North as low as two percent.

Literacy is much lower among women than among men. In the cities of Baghdad and Mosul, the proportion of literate females over five was about 20 percent (about half that of the males). Outside of the larger cities, however, female education hardly exists. The proportion of female literates in the rural areas and the smaller towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra and Baghdad provinces barely exceeds one percent.

It is not known how literacy was defined in the census, but even if these figures represent a real ability to read and understand rather than a smattering of education, it is clear that illiteracy is a great handicap to even the simplest form of written instruction. In industry this is apt to put a heavy burden of detailed work on the management of a factory. In agriculture it gives little possibility of supplementing the limited amount of oral instruction or visual demonstration which the present agricultural service can render.

III. The Standard of Living

No systematic estimate of the national income has yet been made. A rough estimate by the Statistical Office of the United Nations put the income per head in 1949 at $85. The equivalent in dinars would depend on the exchange rate chosen for conversion, which is necessarily an arbitrary choice; at the old rate, it would be about ID 20, at the new ID 30. The Mission attempted to make an estimate of the national product, but the information

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

available to it was often unreliable, if not actually conflicting, and, in certain fields, data were completely lacking. The attempt was, therefore, abandoned, but it was at least possible to draw the conclusion that the estimate quoted above was approximately correct and that the total income per head probably fell somewhere between ID 20 and ID 30.

In any event, a broad estimate of this kind which embraces both the very high incomes of the landowners and the very low incomes of the fellahin can do little more than convey a generalized impression of poverty. While it is not possible to give even a rough idea of the distribution of incomes in statistical terms, some description of the standard of living of the people may be of value.

Agriculture, which is the most important occupation in Iraq, is also the most difficult to describe, conditions being extremely varied and information virtually nonexistent. However, a hypothetical example of the condition of a fellah in the irrigation zone, where barley is the principal crop, may serve as a rough guide. In this zone a fellah, who cultivates 25 donums of winter crops annually, is probably above the average. Estimates of yields vary enormously, even apart from the annual variation due to water supply. Landowners tend to give a high estimate (e.g., 500 kilograms per donum), because they believe that the fellahin withhold part of the crop in order to obtain a larger share. This is probably true and accounts for the tendency of the fellah to give a low estimate (e.g., 200 kg). Apart from this, the land varies greatly in quality, pump-irrigated land being generally more productive. The fellah, however, gets a smaller share on pump land.

A yield of 300 kg on flow-irrigated land would probably not be much below average, if at all. The total crop on 25 donums would then be 7.5 tons. Of this the fellah would probably get as his share two fifths or three tons, out of which he has to retain seed for the next year and to pay for some help with the threshing and harvesting, in all amounting to one half to one ton more. The balance would thus be two to two and a half tons. His family might consist of five or six people, including himself, his wife and children, and one or two other relatives such as his parents or an unmarried sister. The minimum retained for food would be one ton and, in practice, it is probably more. He would thus have

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little more than one ton left to sell and he might even have to keep part of this for his draft animals, if they are unable to find enough stubble and other natural fodder.

The price which a fellah gets for his grain is usually very much less than the wholesale market price in Basra or Baghdad. Although rail transport is very cheap for grains, the other costs such as local transport, bagging, weighing and storage are high; the merchants' profit and the *istihlak* tax also have to be deducted. Finally, the fellah's funds are usually exhausted before the harvest season and he frequently accepts a low forward price on his crop before it is gathered. For the 1950-51 crop, prices have been high (over ID 20 per ton), but many fellahin undoubtedly sold forward at prices little over ID 10. This would not be an unusual price in past seasons. Thus, ID 10 for the winter crop and perhaps another ID 10 for a small summer crop of sesame would constitute his total cash income for the year.

This income would usually be spent on food, clothing and possibly some low-grade domestic tobacco. Two of the most important items in food expenditure are sugar and tea. Dates, particularly in the South, and a few vegetables such as onions are also purchased, but, on the whole, most fruit and vegetables are beyond the reach of the fellah and are sold in the towns. Meat is only eaten occasionally, although fish is available in the marsh areas of the South. Nor does the fellah who owns no animals other than his draft animals consume much milk or *leban* (sour milk). Clothing would consist of some cheap cotton sheeting sufficient for a few garments and occasionally a second-hand jacket; few fellahin wear shoes. Hardly anything is spent on housing or furniture, the living quarters being a small mud hut without windows and hardly any furnishing but a few mats and cooking utensils. Soap, for example, is undoubtedly a luxury. Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it.

In the process of selling his surplus crop and making his small purchases, the fellah is taxed. While with crops consumed in Iraq the *istihlak* tax is largely borne by the buyer, in the case of an export crop such as barley, which is influenced by world prices, the tax falls most heavily on the producer. At the end of 1950, customs duties on sugar were about one fifth to one quarter of the

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511 651 Baghdad retail price; on tea, about one sixth. Duties on textiles are also high, but cannot be so easily measured in terms of the retail price, while excise and other revenue collected on tobacco are also very large. In the case of barley, these indirect taxes on sale and purchase might reduce the fellah's real income from his saleable surplus by as much as one third.

511 Although the villager contributes to the revenue of the country, he receives little in the way of benefits from its expenditure. He is usually without any kind of education, which in itself militates against the improvement of his position. Thus the average fellah would not be able to read even the simplest leaflets, which might be published to improve his methods of cultivation. Government officials, who might impart this knowledge by personal contact, are too few or too hampered by lack of transport to be able to reach him. Much the same applies to his health, which is generally poor in the first instance because he is unable to afford an adequate diet.

Apart from a few generalizations, lack of information prevents comparison with other types of agriculture such as rice cultivation in the marsh areas of the South, date-gardening along the Euphrates and in Basra or grain-growing in the North. In general, the rice areas appear to be extremely congested and living standards are probably the lowest of all. Land in the North is more plentiful, the smallholder is more common, and, in any case, the share of the landlord is far lower, but rainfall is uncertain and yields vary disastrously from year to year.

There are, of course, fellahin who have additional sources of income. The principal source is livestock. A fellah, who, in addition to working the land, owns a few cows or water buffalo is, by comparison, a rich man, but such people are not common. The capital required to purchase an animal may be several times the annual cash income of the poor fellah. Some may seek casual work during the long off-season, but again these are the minority.

The condition of the settlers in the Dujaila project is in striking contrast to that of the average fellah. The principal reason for their improved standard of living is the fact that they do not have to pay any share to a landlord. Their income is for that reason alone more than double. In addition, they have been able to acquire cows, sheep, goats and chickens. Many of them have fruit gardens.

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As a consequence they have a far healthier diet and are obviously better dressed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a farmer who himself employs a fellah. Although this is partly a consequence of the large size of his plot (100 donums including fallow), it is indicative of his much higher standard of living.

In the towns, workers with regular employment would be much better off than the poor fellah, but in cities such as Basra and Baghdad where there has been a great influx of people from the country, there is considerable underemployment in addition to unemployment. Although, at the current rate of wages for casual labor (about 200 to 250 fils a day) a man might theoretically earn an annual income of ID 75 or more, there must be many who work irregularly and earn less than ID 50. Bread and rice are comparatively costly and, together with the rent of a room for a man's family, might take nearly half his income.

Wages are probably not much higher in many of the smaller and more primitive industries, but artisans such as plumbers and electricians are scarce and can command much higher wages. In the more modern industries, such as the oil industry, the Port of Basra and the new factories in Baghdad, a skilled machinist can earn a dinar a day or more. On the clerical side, in the lowest grade of the regular civil service a married official with more than one child receives ID 13 per month.

The higher income of the city-dweller with regular employment enables him to purchase a reasonable diet, better clothing and better housing. He also has access to educational and health services. Nevertheless, congestion and sanitary conditions are often very bad in certain parts of the cities and disease is common.

Above these various classes is the small rich group of landowners and merchants. No estimate of the proportion of the national income accruing to this group is possible, but some indication can be gleaned from the fact that a landowner in the South normally gets at least half the net value of the output from the land, while, in industry, profits may exceed the total payroll.

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state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is prescribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

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Expansion of Health Education

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Iraq has a small, wealthy upper class and a small middle class. The great majority of the people are poor and ignorant, most especially in regard to health measures. Health education is badly needed and there is no doubt that the people would respond readily to teaching. Large groups enthusiastically attended all the shows put on for the health week held in Diwaniya province; competitions for the best eating-house, butcher's shop and barber's shop were keenly contested and visitors thronged to see the model house and the medical exhibition. The oil company in Kirkuk employs a British sanitary inspector and the Railways Administration in Baghdad recently sent their Iraqi sanitary inspector to take a course of study in the United Kingdom. The response of the householders in these places to sanitary measures is striking; their pride in their homes is obvious and the absence of flies conspicuous.

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To begin with, every doctor should have a thorough understanding of the relation of environmental factors to disease. Greater emphasis on the teaching of preventive medicine and particularly of social medicine in the medical school, as has already been recommended, would help to inculcate a wider appreciation of the importance of the preventive outlook in all medical work. Like doctors, nurses have a unique opportunity to teach their patients, and personal and domestic hygiene should take their proper place in the training courses for nurses. Every hospital should be an object lesson in hygiene and every patient should learn by his stay in it.

Health education must be given an important place in the curriculum of the teachers' training schools, and special courses in the prevention of the diseases associated with irrigation and cultivation should be included in the syllabus of the School of Agriculture and of the School of Engineering.

Hygiene is already taught in the schools but ought to be given greater emphasis. Personal hygiene is essentially a matter of habit formation and young school children should be trained in good habits as a daily routine. Special classes could be given in the prevention of the main endemic diseases—possibly, in some cases, by the school medical officer. It is for the Health Department to

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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

Economic Survey

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com- 342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the [511] country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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311 which may play a prominent part in the economic development of the country, Mesopotamia may be regarded as
162 a purely agricultural land. From this standpoint it is best considered in two sections. There is the river-irrigated date-growing district to the south, with Basra as its center, and there is the district to the north inhabited by nomads, semi-nomads and river agriculturists, with its principal center in Baghdad and a second capital further north in Mosul.

312 The date gardeners along the river in the Basra terri-
245 tory resemble in many ways the cultivators that can be seen in any oasis town in Arabia. Their work is very similar. Irrigation systems must be constructed. Channels must be provided to carry the water to the roots of the date palms and to the squares of alfalfa and other crops. There is this difference, however, that the water flows of itself. Twice a day the tide of the ocean backs up the water of the great Arab River as far as Gurna, about a hundred miles from the sea. The extensive cultivation of dates stops at that point. The water can be shut out of a field if so desired, or the gates can be opened and as much allowed to enter as is needed. The supply is unlimited and can be had twice a day the year around. The soil is ideal. It is rich and hundreds of feet deep. In natural endowment Mesopotamia is a paradise for date gardeners.

511 As a matter of fact, however, that country is far from a paradise for date gardeners. The favorable conditions ought to make their work easier and their remuneration greater, but the facts are otherwise. Their condition is worse than that of the cultivators in Hasa. It is the story of the Bahrein pearl banks over again. The increased wealth of the Bahrein pearl banks has not bene-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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511 fited the Bahrein pearl diver; it has produced richer merchants in that district. In the same way the land-owners of Mesopotamia are past all comparison richer than the land-owners of the oases in Arabia but the actual cultivators of the soil are far worse off. Improved conditions and an increased return on each man's work have not benefited them at all.

423 427 511 Their condition is pitiful. The gardens are owned by men who live far away in distance and farther away still in sympathy. The Sheikh of Kuwait owns large gardens in this district; indeed his principal wealth is reputed to be invested there. The same is true of Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, the Persian governor for southern Arabistan. Many of the gardens are owned by rich men who live in Basra and Baghdad. Their affairs are administered by a local agent, whose sole interest lies in driving as hard a bargain as possible with the unfortunate cultivator. If an unfavorable year comes, there is no easily available judge or ruler to modify the contract as in Arabia. As a result the gardeners are bitterly oppressed. Men are practically forced into bankruptcy in order to live up to oppressive contracts during a hard year. Competition is keen, and in these large communities where the gardens stretch for scores of miles and where it is not easy to turn to other occupations, where above all there is no public sentiment to appeal to and no ruler with Arab ideas of justice to frown upon the rich oppressor, it is possible to push the gardener down very close to the limit of bare subsistence. His clothes are in tatters. His food is poor. His house is wretched. Above all he is a discouraged and hard-pressed individual with a hopeless and despairing outlook on life.

1 [Date gardeners -- Analyst]

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-
511 lent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

565 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agri-
463 cultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were
795 sometimes harder to manage than the men. It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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well as many western food products, such as candies and fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil, much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles are to be seen, and in some places even electric lights. All these things represent the gratification of wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western influence.

There has also been a development of the export trade of the country. However, the articles for export are not many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product, together with a certain amount of wheat and rice and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no more can be brought into the country than is sent out of it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

Just how far these various modern improvements will go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power, there is no doubt that material development will be steady and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to an independent local government, progress will be much slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire for many western products and for western education. Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national development with the elimination of every foreign influence. The common people long for the golden days of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

20: Hourani B-6 (1946) 1947 MI Middle East

the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separation and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

20: Hourani 8-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the standard of living. This had serious consequences when the war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

563 668 54

The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

563 621

At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari district of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

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29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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poverty probably unequalled anywhere in the world. Throughout the centuries, production has declined as neglect and misuse have drained the fertility from the soils and permitted salt to seep in and ruin for cultivation thousands of acres in this Garden of Eden.

The people, undernourished and ravaged by disease, have degenerated as the land has deteriorated. One would never guess that the present inhabitants, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, were in any way related to those men who shaped the history of the world for so many centuries. Many

[Text continues on p. 88--Analyst]

Table 27

IRAQ: Specified Exports as Per Cent of Total Exports
1937, 1949, 1950, and 1951
Value

Item	1937	1949	1950	1951
	Per Cent			
Crude Petroleum	65	52	51	51
Barley	7	20	19	21
Dates	6	11	10	19
Others	22	16	20	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Total Value Converted to Millions of Dollars	79	92	126	166

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

Table 28

IRAQ: Exports to Specified Countries as Per Cent of Total Exports
1937, 1949, and 1950
Value

Country	1937	1949	1950
	Per Cent		
France	51	25	38
United Kingdom	18	14	12
United States	7	2	6
India	2	9	3
Netherlands		8	7
Others	22	42	34
Total	100	100	100

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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511 of the people are even more primitive than their ancestors of several thousand years ago. They live on the ground in mud huts, in the shadows of the stone ruin of their ancestors' homes. They draw water by hand from wells from which water was once pulled by giant water wheels; they irrigate their tiny garden patches with hand scoops where once large canals watered thousands of acres.

871 212 Despite the progress in education, less than half the children are in school, and only half of those fortunate ones finish the primary grades. In the country as a whole, 80 per cent of the males and 95 per cent of the females are still illiterate.

These people now hope for a new life, a place in the sun again.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

651 382 The internationally-owned oil companies operating in Iraq recently have increased oil output materially and expect by 1955 to be producing at a rate five times above the 1951 level. Half of the profits before taxes will accrue to the Iraq Government, and should amount to about $600 million during the next five years.

647 654 These revenues will be assigned to the Central Development Board, an autonomous agency established to insure greater continuity in the planning and implementation of development programs. An American, Wesley Nelson, formerly Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of Interior, is a member of the board by invitation of the Iraq Government.

FINANCING

652 654 The Board is following rather closely a development program recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development after its special mission made a detailed study of the Iraq economy at the request of the government. The cost of the suggested five-year program, beginning with fiscal 1952-53, is estimated at approximately $471.8 million to be apportioned as follows:

Project	*In Millions of Dollars*
Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	154.5
Industry	103.6
Transport and communications	86.8
Community Facilities	65.0
Agriculture and Forestry	21.0
Education	17.1
Public Health	14.0
Development Board administration, studies, etc.	4.2
Miscellaneous expenditures	5.6
	471.8

To carry out the program the Development Board would have to spend $42 million in 1952-53 and successively larger sums each year, up to a total of $140 million in 1956-57.[33]

[33] *Economic Development of Iraq*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 63.

59; Allen et al S-3 (1952-53) 1953 MI Middle East
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II. [illegible] BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE

A. PRESENT CONDITIONS

369 511 162 The some 4,000,000 more people of Iraq who live the rural areas have been long characterized by many people both within and outside Iraq as suffering from poverty, ill health and illiteracy. These conditions become readily apparent to one visiting the villages of the country today. The characterization of the people can be extended to their being ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed.

369 511 The survey was immediately impressed with the crude and inefficient methods of making a living and the unnecessarily poor and unhealthy home and village life. These conditions can be remedied by instruction and assistance. People farm with primitive equipment and are wasteful of land and water. In village after village there are mud huts without light or fresh air. Families live, sleep and eat in single rooms packed together with animals, food, stores, farming equipment and refuse. Children play in courtyards filled with animal dung and filth, many people suffer from infected eyes, skin sores and diseases caused by unsanitary conditions which could be greatly reduced by better sanitary conditions. In the [illegible]es food is prepared on the floors where it comes in contact with the accum[illegible]ted filth, flies, chickens, dogs and other animals. Pots and pans and mixing s[illegible]ns lie on the ground. They are crudely cleaned with dirty water or old rag[illegible]. There are no such things as kitchens, screened lockers for food or clean and covered places for drinking water in the homes of the rural villagers. Instruction in home care could overcome much of this.

369 364 511 The lack of pure drinking water is one of the most acute problems in these villages. Some pumps and water tanks and some water piped from springs to collection pools have been installed. However, these facilities frequently lack sanitary protection and show lack of proper maintenance by the communities. Often wells have around them accumulation of stagnant water, mud and animal dung. Another acute problem is the lack of any facilities in many villages, and homes for taking care of human waste. Where toilets exist they are more uncovered holes open to flies and a source of spreading disease.

369 871 Many villages have not yet received the benefit of schools where children can learn some of the concepts and techniques which would enable them to understand the need for improving their conditions and help their families in doing so. In some villages young girls are not allowed by their elders to attend school or not provided with primary schools, buildings and teachers. Much of a new generation is growing up illiterate and ignorant of how they might help themselves when they grow up.

369 423 471 511 Inquiry among villagers and local officials revealed that although there might be a headman or mukhtar of the village, nearly all direction and management of their affairs comes from outside leadership. Communities lack the local leadership and organization by which they might progress through their own efforts. Sheikhs, landlords, their agents (sirkal) who are frequently local government representatives as well, direct the farming operations, decide the lands on which the villagers will farm and live, provide much of the seed and equipment, direct the cleaning of ditches, collect the shares of crops and other payments and decide whether or not the farmers may live and work on the land during the next year. Even the farmer who owns his own land is not without obligations to money lenders, tax collectors and government supervision. The farmers and tenants of Iraq are dependent upon

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369 others almost for life itself. In their position they cannot help themselves, but
423 go on generation after generation at the same poor level of living. There are no
471 committees or councils to represent themselves or which government sources might
511 utilize for participation in family and village development programmes.

369 Many other problems such as undeveloped village crafts and industries, lack
433 of access roads and marketing facilities might be added. Enough has been
511 described to indicate the great and urgent need for a broad programme for assistance to the rural population of the country. It is recognized that these are not new conditions but part of a way of life that has been characteristic of these people for centuries. The wealth and labour of the land through all these years has been for the welfare of the few who ruled. It has been only within comparatively recent years that the leaders of Iraq have become concerned about or in a position to help in the improvement of rural affairs.

B. CAUSES OF CONDITIONS

369 Many factors beside tradition have contributed to the present plight of the
566 rural people. Essentially their problems stem from the lack of security on the land, the lack of financial means or credit to develop their farming or crafts and the lack of knowledge to promote their own advancement.

1. System of Land Tenure

369 The major and self-evident cause of present poverty is the lack of ownership
423 of land and of any security under the tenant system. The tenant owns no farm or
471 house. He must shift his farming operations or even leave the land as he is directed. Therefore, he has no base on which to build a better life or earn a better income. The small land farmer who owns his own land frequently has an insufficient amount to provide adequate income.

2. Lack of Credit

369 Credit for the small farmer or tenant is virtually unavailable. Both tenant
452 and small owner are subject to a system of sharecropping or credit which by
566 exorbitant rates leaves them with insufficient balance from their crops for their own subsistence. In fact some tenants receive as little as 20 to 30 per cent of their crop. Small farmers often have to forfeit their lands because they cannot pay off their mortgages and work in the employ of their creditors. Rarely it was found that a small farmer received a loan from the Agricultural Bank.

3. Poor Land Use

369 The landlord, however, does not always stand to make great profits. He loses
566 more proportionately than the tenant during crop failures when he must provide them
311 with food and receive no return. He loses continually from their inefficient farming methods, their ill-health and limited ability to work and the uses to which he puts his lands.

4. Lack of Knowledge and Training

369 Especially important among these reasons for poverty is lack of training and
871 information. The rural people are for the most part without education in its
212 broadest and most fundamental sense. First, there is a lack of ability to read and write to obtain more information.

241 tables in season. Citrus fruits flourish in the irrigated areas of Kerbela province and in the Diyala river valley, while grapes, apricots and other fruits grow in various localities. Numerous species of dates are cultivated, especially in the Shatt al Arab and lower Euphrates basins: they represent one of the basic foods of the people.

511 The financial circumstances of most families prohibit the consumption of meat,
233 except at irregular intervals. Sheep and goats are raised in large numbers, both by the settled and the nomadic peoples, and constitute the principal sources of
226 meat. Fish are a valuable food among
231 the peoples living in the river valleys and along the coast. Fowl are kept in the rural
262 villages. Milk is a standard article of diet
234 wherever it is obtainable. The milk of sheep or goats is most widely used, but that of cows, water buffaloes and camels is utilized in many areas. Milk is normally consumed in the form of buttermilk or a soured milk product, known as *leban*. Cheese is also made, but it is rarely as popular as in other Arab countries. Clarified butter and the fats derived from the tail tissues of the local breeds of sheep are important sources of fat among all population groups.

262 The least diversified diets are probably found among the nomadic tribes, who subsist on the products of their herds, supplemented by dates and wheat or barley breads. Camel's milk is employed by the
[234] nomadic Bedouin. The tribal Arabs of the southern marshes depend largely upon the milk of the water buffalo, fish and wild waterfowl, rice and occasional edible rushes.

146 Measures to raise the standards of nutrition among the various urban and rural groups are being studied by educational and
165 health authorities. Improper feeding in in-
853 fancy, particularly in the course of weaning, which is often deferred until the second year of life, is a factor contributing to the
146 high mortality among young children. The
657 organization of a national nutrition committee, to function in an advisory capacity to the governmental agencies concerned, and

milk products, or from contact with infected animals. From 5 to 97 cases were treated annually in government institutions in the 6 years 1944-49. In the examination of 2,548 blood serum specimens sent to the Wassermann laboratory in Baghdad in 1938,[4] positive agglutination with Brucella antigens was obtained in 6 per cent. *Br. melitensis* was isolated from 5 of the 13 samples from which bacteriologic cultures were made.

Diseases Spread Chiefly Through the Respiratory Tract

Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is among the most serious diseases in Iraq. In 1944-49, from 3,400 to 6,800 cases of pulmonary and from 1,400 to 3,100 of nonpulmonary tuberculosis were recorded annually. Such figures are of little value in assessing the problem, however, due to inadequate reporting and the shortage of diagnostic and treatment facilities. Local authorities estimate that the prevalence of latent or active infections approximates at least 25 to 30 per cent in many villages in the vicinity of Kirkuk and Basra, and undoubtedly in other areas. Widespread undernutrition and low standards of living, associated with overcrowding and ignorance of the basic principles of hygiene, are factors contributing to the spread of the disease. The death rates are known to be high, but little precise information is available. It is believed that a considerable number of tuberculosis deaths are erroneously attributed to pneumonia and other respiratory infections. Moreover, the inhabitants are often reluctant to admit the presence of tuberculosis in the family due to the stigma customarily attached to the disease. In the decade 1941-50, an average of 760 cases were treated in government hospitals each year, with a fatality rate of about 25 per cent. The maximum number of cases occurred in the group from 16 to 30 years of age.

All types of tuberculosis are encountered. Involvement of the bones or the glands accounts for a large proportion of the non-

countered. The prevalence rarely exceeds 5 to 20 cases a year, but, in 1948, outbreaks totaling 185 cases were recorded. Rheumatic fever is one of the most important diseases of childhood, particularly in Baghdad. From 10,000 to 23,000 cases were treated annually in the government hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country in 1944-49. Poliomyelitis was formerly regarded as sporadic, but cases are being recognized with increasing frequency. With improved diagnostic facilities, 70 to 100 cases have been reported annually since 1949 from the children's hospital in Baghdad.

Diseases Spread or Contracted Chiefly Through Contact

Venereal Diseases. All forms of venereal disease are encountered, especially in the urban communities. Syphilis predominates among the recognized cases; congenital syphilis is common. The prevalence of the disease in Baghdad and other cities is estimated locally at between 2 and 10 per cent. Chancroid and gonorrhea are widespread, but the extent of infection in the general population is not accurately known. Lymphogranuloma venereum and granuloma inguinale are relatively rare. The cases of venereal disease treated in government institutions averaged about 38,600 annually in the 6 years 1944-49. Roughly 65 per cent were diagnosed as syphilis, 26 per cent as gonorrhea and 9 per cent as chancroid. Treatment is provided by the health authorities in the various general hospitals and dispensaries, as well as in 2 special venereal disease hospitals.

Bejel is widely distributed among the nomadic and the seminomadic peoples in the Tigris and the Euphrates valleys and around the marshes and the lakes in the lower delta region. Apparently a form of syphilis transmitted by nonvenereal contact, the disease is characterized by a predominance of mucocutaneous lesions, usually with a high degree of oral and pharyngeal involvement. It is associated with primitive conditions of living, and is most extensive

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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Bejel in Iraq. Areas of Greatest Prevalence

in the settlements bordering the larger rivers and the marshes, where it is known locally by different names, chiefly *bejel*, *lawath* and *abou khisian*. It is believed that at least two thirds of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the maximum transmission between 2 and 5 years of age. Serious foci, in which the disease sometimes reaches epidemic proportions, exist in the southeastern provinces and along the Tigris and its tributaries in Mosul *liwa*. The districts around the Amarah marshes are probably the most severely affected, but infection rates of over 50 per cent are found in many villages in Amarah, Muntafiq, Basra and Mosul *liwas*. An important focus also persists in Dulaim *liwa*, in the vicinity of Hit and Ramadi. Surveys have shown moderately high infection rates in some villages, while in others the existence of 20 to 25 per cent of seropositive latent cases is suggestive of epidemic conditions in the recent past. The disease is present among the Bedouin tribes of the desert, but is absent among the Kurdish populations of the northeastern mountain districts. Indigenous cases are seldom seen in the towns, although a focus has been established in Baghdad,

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164 369 is endemic in the alluvial plain region, within a radius of about 100 miles around Baghdad, which is one of the major foci in the Middle East. There the infection rates average 20 to 60 per cent, and probably approach 95 per cent in many localities, especially in the older parts of the city. Outside of this traditional focus, the infection is distributed irregularly. Some of the agricultural districts to the south are relatively free from the disease, but in the more compact towns and villages the infection rates are as high as 40 per cent. In Basra and Muntafiq *liwas*, the extent of infection is slight, and even in the towns the prevalence probably does not exceed 3 to 4 per cent. North of Baghdad the disease appears to be confined to isolated foci. It is widespread in the city of Mosul and in the towns of Beled, Samarrah and 'Aqra, but is almost completely absent from the steppe country and from the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

164 158 In the 6-year period 1944-49, the cases of Oriental sore treated annually in government institutions ranged between a minimum of 2,910 in 1948 and a maximum of 10,502 in 1945. All ages are affected, but most of the infections are acquired in childhood, with the greatest susceptibility between 1 and 4 years of age. Multiple lesions are frequent, particularly among individuals living in congested and unhygienic surroundings. Ulcerative sores predominate, but the nodular type is seen in a large percentage of the cases. Secondary tuberculoid lesions, arising in healing ulcers, are also common in children. The largest number of cases is usually observed in August, September and October. *Phlebotomus sergenti* is apparently the only important vector in Iraq, as in Pakistan. Cutaneous infections occur among the dogs and the cats found in the cities, but they are thought to play a minor role in the spread of the human disease.

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164 369 Visceral leishmaniasis, or kala-azar, is suspected of being sporadic in the northern part of the country, although up to 1950

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only 1 case, in which the diagnosis was confirmed by laboratory examination, had been recorded. Potential sandfly vectors of kala-azar are apparently absent in the southern and the central provinces, but they may exist in the northern highlands. 164 369

Other Infections. Sandfly fever is endemic, and, in the delta region, reaches epidemic proportions every few years. From 842 to 4,688 cases were recorded annually in 1944-49. The sandfly vector, *Phlebotomus papatasii*, is widely distributed. The season of transmission usually extends from May to November, with a peak in June or July. Outbreaks of dengue fever are sporadic in the south. 164

Cases of elephantiasis of undetermined origin are occasionally encountered, but *Wuchereria bancrofti* is not known to be present. Guinea worm infections are sometimes seen in pilgrims from southern Iran, but no indigenous cases have been recorded. [484]

Nutritional Diseases

Undernutrition, anemia and avitaminosis are prevalent, especially among the wage-earning classes in the cities and the impoverished peasants of the south. Clinical manifestations of vitamin A and vitamin C deficiencies are widespread. In general, serious nutritional diseases tend to be more or less localized in distribution, depending upon the dietary habits and the standards of living of the people. Rickets is common, and from 100 to 2,387 cases were treated annually in the government institutions in 1944-49. Cases of scurvy and of osteomalacia are numerous. Beriberi and pellagra are sporadic, but minor symptoms of riboflavin deficiency are frequently observed. Protein edema is rare. A form of cirrhosis of the liver is encountered in which [illegible] nutrition is believed by some authorities to be a contributory factor. 146 511 361

Miscellaneous Conditions

Infectious hepatitis is endemic, and large-scale epidemics are reported occasionally. Encephalitis lethargica is sporadic. 114

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